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Spoliation Remedies in Spotted Horse: Dealing Effectively with the 
Last Refuge of a Scoundrel  
Jason M. Collins  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The spoliation of evidence presents special problems in litigation 
that are often inadequately addressed by judges.  Unless the judiciary 
becomes more willing to use default judgment as a sanction for 
spoliation, there will continue to be many cases where it is impossible to 
simultaneously punish the spoliator, deter future spoliation, and do 
justice to the party harmed.  But until there is a clear test for when 
default judgment is appropriate in spoliation claims, it is unlikely district 
courts will be more inclined to use it.  In Spotted Horse v. BNSF R.R. 
Co.1, the Montana Supreme Court missed an opportunity to explain when 
and how default judgment is appropriately to be employed as both an 
effective deterrent and means of doing justice to the party harmed.  
Without that clear direction, district courts will likely continue to fashion 
spoliation sanctions that lack a sufficient remedial value and do little to 
deter spoliators. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Mark Spotted Horse filed suit under the Federal Employer's 
Liability Act in 2010, claiming that his fellow worker injured him as they 
worked in a BNSF Diesel Shop in Havre, Montana.  Spotted Horse 
alleged that his co-worker let loose the rope he was using to lower a 
locomotive engine compartment hatch.  The hatch struck Spotted Horse 
on his head, causing him headaches and neck pain.  Spotted Horse 
immediately reported the incident to supervisors who saw that he was 
taken to the hospital.2  On-site staff and supervisory personnel 
immediately began their investigation into Spotted Horse's injury even as 
he travelled to the hospital. The Senior Site Manager gathered Spotted 
Horse's hard hat, conducted reenactments of the injury, took 
photographs, interviewed witnesses, and took statements from Spotted 
Horse and his co-worker.3  These BNSF staff members and supervisors 
were well versed in documenting workplace injuries and preserving 
evidence for their later adjudication.4    
The Diesel Shop had a digital surveillance system that displayed 
and recorded the goings-on of various locations around the shop, twenty-
                                           
1 Spotted Horse v. BNSF R.R. Co., 350 P.3d 52 (Mont. 2015). 
2 Id. at 53–54. 
3 Id. at 54, 57. 
4 Id. at 54, 56. 
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four hours a day.5  BNSF often used footage from this system to 
investigate injuries, workplace violations, and discipline employees.6  If 
no one requested footage from the system within fifteen to thirty days, 
the system would automatically overwrite existing footage to conserve 
storage space.  BNSF personnel routinely issued requests to preserve 
footage, and were familiar with the process required to do so.7  Spotted 
Horse alleged that he requested footage from this system during his post-
accident interview, and his counsel later requested footage in discovery.  
BNSF provided Spotted Horse with photographs but never surrendered 
any video footage.  After Spotted Horse's counsel successfully moved the 
court to compel BNSF to turn over the video, BNSF responded that the 
video had been automatically overwritten due to the passage of time.  
The Resource Operations Center (ROC), BNSF's department charged 
with managing the video feeds and storage, never received a request to 
preserve videos from the accident in over forty-two days after the 
accident happened.8  
The ROC never received a preservation request because BNSF 
General Foreman Paul McLeod, who conducted the initial investigation, 
took photographs, and staged reenactments after Spotted Horse left for 
the hospital, had personally reviewed footage from one of the cameras 
with other staff members and determined that there was no evidence to 
preserve.9  McLeod acknowledged that he would have had no problem 
submitting a request to preserve the video footage, but he claimed that 
the feed from one camera thought most likely to show something 
relevant neither showed the injury occurring nor the general area where 
Spotted Horse was working.  McLeod did not view footage from any of 
the other cameras, but admitted that they could have shown Spotted 
Horse and his co-worker working around the shop.  Two other managers 
and supervisors claimed to have watched the video from the one camera 
with McLeod and agreed with him that there was nothing to see.10   
Normally, when the BNSF claims department is notified of a 
pending claim where video evidence is involved, a claims representative 
will submit a request to the ROC to preserve the evidence.  However, 
McLeod delayed submitting his findings to the claims department as 
BNSF had no policy in place mandating that supervisors must 
immediately notify a claims representative of an incident.  This meant 
that no one from BNSF ever submitted a timely request to the ROC to 
preserve footage from any of the cameras at the worksite where Spotted 
Horse alleged he was injured.11   
                                           
5 Id. at 54. 
6 Id. 




11 Id. at 55. 
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Alleging spoliation of the video footage and other discovery 
abuses, Spotted Horse moved the District Court for default judgment on 
issues of liability, causation, and contributory negligence.  The District 
Court denied the motion but prohibited BNSF from introducing evidence 
relating to or referring to the video footage unless Spotted Horse did so 
first.12  If Spotted Horse mentioned the video footage first, BNSF could 
then tell the jury what the video purported to show—nothing, according 
to McLeod.  Notwithstanding the Court's response, both parties presented 
evidence and testimony at trial concerning the footage's relevancy and 
unavailability.  The Court gave the jury an instruction that read: 
 
If it appears that a party intentionally or recklessly 
destroyed or concealed evidence favorable to the other 
party, then you should view any contrary evidence 
presented by that party with distrust.13 
 
The jury found in favor of BNSF and the case was dismissed with 
prejudice.  When the Court denied him a new trial, Spotted Horse 
appealed.  On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court framed the main issue 
as whether the District Court erred in refusing to grant Spotted Horse a 
default judgment because of the spoliation of the video footage.14   
III. DISCUSSION 
 
The Court first noted that spoliation claims between parties in 
litigation are properly handled through judicial sanctions under the 
holding of Oliver v. Stimson.15  Under Oliver, default judgment is an 
appropriate sanction when circumstances justify it.16  The circumstances 
justifying default judgment arise from extreme and willful misbehavior 
by the offending party.17  The Court decided such misbehavior includes: 
(1) a “pattern of willful and bad faith conduct” amounting to a “blatant 
and systemic” abuse of the discovery process undermining the integrity 
of the entire proceeding;18 (2) “evasive and woefully incomplete” 
discovery responses resulting in a “flagrant, complete and persistent 
disregard” of court orders;19 and (3) an intention to “slow down 
discovery.”20  The Court stressed that merely encouraging parties to 
                                           
12 Id. 
13 Spotted Horse, 350 P.3d at 55. 
14 Id. at 55–56. 
15 Id. at 56 (citing Oliver v. Stimson, 993 P.2d 11, 17 (Mont. 1999)). 
16 Id. (see Oliver, 993 P.2d at 17). 
17 Id. (citing Richardson v. State, 130 P.3d 634, 640 (Mont. 2006)). 
18 Id. (citing Culbertson-Froid-Bainville Health Corp. v. JP Stevens & Co. Inc., 122 P.3d 431, 436 
(Mont. 2005)). 
19 Spotted Horse, 350 P.3d at 56 (citing Schuff v. A.T. Klemens & Son, 16 P.3d 1002, 1019 (Mont. 
2000)). 
20 Id. (citing Stokes v. Ford Motor Co., 300 P.3d 648, 653 (Mont. 2013)). 
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cooperate is no sanction at all.  The Court admonished district courts' 
past reluctance to dole out significant punishment for spoliators by 
emphasizing that discovery abuses merit stiff punishments sufficient to 
deter future transgressions.21     
Although BNSF's spoliation occurred before litigation and the 
discovery process began, the Court found the failure to preserve evidence 
under such circumstances no less incendiary.  The strict policy of 
preserving relevant evidence applied here “with equal force” because 
BNSF was no stranger to litigation in general and spoliation claims in 
particular.22  The Court explored several past cases that exposed BNSF 
as “a seasoned and sophisticated corporate litigant well aware of its 
obligation [to retain relevant evidence] when responding to workplace 
violations and workplace injuries[.]”  The Court discussed BNSF's 
systematic gathering of relevant information, even as Spotted Horse was 
driven to the hospital, as evidence of a company well versed in gearing 
up for complex litigation.  Thus, the decision from those same 
investigators and supervisors to view, but not retain the video footage, 
was inexplicable and "disconcerting" to the Court because BNSF had no 
right to determine on its own which evidence was relevant.23  BNSF's 
unilateral decision to discard evidence it had the means and foresight to 
preserve meant that the “search for the truth” surrounding Spotted 
Horse's allegations had been effectively subverted.24   
Having established BNSF's spoliation as a fact, the Court next 
analyzed the propriety of the District Court's remedy.  Unsurprisingly, 
the Court found the District Court erred in its instruction because the 
instruction actually rewarded BNSF while providing Spotted Horse with 
no relief.25  But rather than grant Spotted Horse's request for default 
judgment, the Court instead remanded the case for a new trial and 
instructed the District Court to concoct a remedy that would be both 
palliative to Spotted Horse and commensurate with the severity of 
BNSF's “actions in allowing the video to be destroyed.”26 
Justice Wheat specially concurred.  He found that the proper 
remedy was not a new trial, but default judgment—as Spotted Horse 
initially requested.  Where there is a case of malicious misuse, he argued, 
the judicial system must protect its integrity by punishing the misuser, 
remedying the misuse, and deterring future misuse.27  Spoliation, 
according to Wheat, is such a case of malicious misuse of the judicial 
system; it is especially pernicious in that it undermines the overall 
                                           
21 Id. (citing Schuff, 16 P.3d at 1019). 
22 Id. at 56. 
23 Id. at 57. 
24 Id. at 58 (citing Oliver, 993 P2d at 17; and Schuff, 16 P.3d at 1019). 
25 Spotted Horse, 350 P.3d at 59. 
26 Id. at 59–60. 
27 Id. at 60–61. 
2015 SPOLIATION REMEDIES IN SPOTTED HORSE 137 
  
 
integrity of civil litigation.28  “There can be no truth, fairness or justice in 
a civil action where relevant evidence has been destroyed before trial.”  
Wheat asserted also that spoliation of evidence is not only virulent, it is 
becoming increasingly prolific.  Only a court system unafraid of 
wielding an adequate remedy can stem the tide.  Wheat argued further 
that the courts are endowed with adequate remedies to prevent the spread 
of spoliation, of which default judgment is one.  But until courts actually 
use it, he said, the system fails the spoliation victim and rewards the 
spoliator with an advantage in litigation that in fact provides an incentive 
for the spoliation cycle to continue.29   
Justice McKinnon dissented for two reasons.  First, she believed 
that BNSF was being punished for its past bad acts and not purely the 
facts and issues before the Court.30  Secondly, she argued that in review 
of sanctions for an abuse of discretion, the trial court should be granted 
great latitude in crafting its remedy.31  She asserted that a reviewing 
Court should be especially mindful that a trial on the merits is always 
preferred over a default judgment.32  In the end, she simply was not 
convinced that the trial court had abused its discretion when it refused to 




 Although Justice McKinnon's dissent expressed concern that 
BNSF's prior bad acts were unfairly brought before the Court, these prior 
discovery abuses were not trotted out for their shock value alone.  
BNSF's past discovery abuses are evidence of an in-depth knowledge of 
litigation and discovery processes.  This imputed corporate knowledge is 
telling when seeking to uncover evidence of bad faith conduct by a 
corporate litigant, especially when attempting to uncover a “pattern of 
willful and bad faith conduct.”34  Absent such knowledge and previous 
court-ordered admonitions, BNSF would have far less culpability here—
a lack of prior wrongdoing would have been some evidence indicative of 
an innocent motive.  Justice McKinnon's deference to the District Court 
would have come at the expense of justice to Spotted Horse.  Although 
she saw value in allowing the instruction to stand and allowing the jury 
then to infer as it saw fit, whatever remedial value the instruction 
contained would have to be gained through cross-examination, forcing 
Spotted Horse's counsel to extract concessions from BNSF employees 
about their failure to preserve or fully review available evidence.  She 
                                           
28 Id. at 61. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 62–63. 
31 Spotted Horse, 350 P.3d at 62–63. 
32 Id. at 62 (citing Brilz v. Metro. Gen. Ins. Co., 285 P.3d 494, 498 (Mont. 2012). 
33 Id. at 63. 
34 Richardson, 130 P.3d at 649. 
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speculated that testimony from such cross-examination “could just as 
likely result in the negative inference that BNSF engaged in a cover 
up.”35  But what Justice McKinnon did not account for in this scenario 
was the burden placed upon Spotted Horse's counsel.  Leaving the 
instruction as the District Court fashioned it placed the burden of remedy 
squarely upon the shoulders of Spotted Horse.  At best, Spotted Horse's 
counsel could place doubt in the minds of the jury with effective cross-
examination, but Justice McKinnon did not explain how this is just.  If 
BNSF was indeed the bad actor here, there is no adequate explanation 
given as to why it is fair to place the burden of remediation on Spotted 
Horse instead of BNSF.  Justice McKinnon's answer seems simply to be 
that although the district court exercised its discretion differently than the 
majority would have, that is not enough for a reviewing court to require 
an alternate remedy.36  Justice McKinnon's argument that reviewing 
courts should be largely deferential to the discretion of district judges is a 
sound policy in theory, but it still does not provide criteria for when it 
would be an abuse of discretion for a District Court to refuse to grant 
default judgment upon finding spoliation. 
 The majority's analysis seemed to head in the direction of 
providing the roadmap Justice McKinnon's opinion lacked.  But in the 
end, the majority opinion provided no clear direction either.  The Court 
successfully explained why spoliation is a problem, and why it merits 
both punishment and remedy.  The opinion also nicely dealt with the fact 
that default judgment is sometimes an appropriate sanction for spoliation 
and that it is reserved for those instances of spoliation that are willful, 
wanton, and wrought with bad faith.  But it did not explain why what 
happened to Spotted Horse is not one of those instances.  In fact, the 
opinion is confusing because it omits any talk at all of willfulness, 
wantonness, or bad faith in its final holding.  The confusing, but key 
sequence of sentences in the holding is this:   
 
Although BNSF clearly knows better than to dispose of 
video footage of an accident scene, it is simply not 
possible to determine whether the destruction of the 
evidence was intentional or inadvertent.  Given this 
circumstance, we do not find that the District Court's 
refusal to grant Spotted Horse's request for a default 
judgment was an abuse of discretion.37  
 
There are two points that make this ruling questionable.  First, 
the language suggests that if the destruction of the evidence was 
intentional, the District Court did indeed abuse its discretion by failing to 
                                           
35 Spotted Horse, 350 P.3d at 63.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 59. 
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grant default judgment.  Following that logic, the appropriateness of 
default judgment would then perhaps rest more upon intentionality than 
willfulness, wantonness, and bad faith.  Earlier in the opinion though, the 
Court explained that default judgment is appropriate when there is 
willfulness, wantonness, or bad faith conduct, and cites several cases 
expounding on such conduct.38  But here, the Court frames the key 
element purely as a question of intent.  This is a crucial question that trial 
courts will no doubt wrestle with in future spoliation claims.  If on one 
hand the issuance of default judgment rests on intentionality alone, then 
the proper analysis for reviewing a spoliation claim may become much 
like an intentional tort—where intent is analyzed in terms of an act as the 
external manifestation of the actor's will, and the foreknowledge of the 
results of that act.39  But if on the other hand it is indeed bad faith or 
willfulness that is the demarcation point, the appropriate analysis may be 
more like assessing punitive damages, where the egregiousness of the 
offense or maliciousness of purpose is instead scrutinized.  The truth is 
that in this context of determining culpability for spoliation of evidence, 
the two concepts are not that far apart.  Intent in torts denotes a volitional 
act coupled with either purpose or substantial certainty that a 
consequence will result.  Hardly ever is the volition of the act an issue, 
though.  Rather, it is whether the actor had the purpose or substantial 
certainty that the consequence would occur.  That substantial certainty of 
the consequences could well be read here as willfulness or bad faith.  At 
the very least the opinion should have used consistent terms for clarity by 
omitting talk of intention and discussing bad faith instead.  This was an 
opportunity for the Court to make these criteria clear: whether a court 
abuses its discretion by refusing to grant default judgment when the 
spoliation of evidence is determined to be intentional or in bad faith; and 
whether spoliation done intentionally necessarily means it was also done 
in bad faith.  Answers to these questions would have given district courts 
a sense of when spoliation merits default judgment.   
 The other unfortunate aspect of this confusion lies in this: For 
Spotted Horse, a careful reading seems to reveal that it does not matter 
whether the necessity of a district court issuing default judgment turns on 
a showing of intentionality or bad faith.  Under either showing, this case 
seemed ripe for default judgment.  Clearly, there are facts of a case to 
which every reader of an appellate opinion is not privy.  However, the 
facts revealed here show that there was both tortious intent and bad faith 
in BNSF's response to Spotted Horse's injury.  There was the deliberate 
decision by McLeod to allow the video system to overwrite the 
recording: he knew he could have requested a copy of the footage; and 
he knew the system would overwrite the recordings if he did not.  That 
                                           
38 Id. at 56. 
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 2, 8A (1965). 
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level of knowledge settles the issue of whether the destruction of this 
evidence was volitional—it was.  The issue then becomes whether it was 
done in bad faith, or with substantial certainty that the consequences of 
evidence irretrievably lost for future litigation would occur.   
Here, the analysis is necessarily more nuanced, but the weight of 
the evidence is great.  McLeod had used video recordings from this 
system before for investigations of workers in connection with 
workplace injuries.40  He knew that preserving the footage was merely a 
matter of a simple phone call or email request to the ROC.41  The Court 
described BNSF as “a seasoned and sophisticated corporate litigant well 
aware of its obligations when responding to . . . employee injuries and 
accidents.”42  The Court specifically identified one of those obligations 
as the duty to retain evidence relevant to injury claims.43  As higher-level 
employees of BNSF, within minutes of Spotted Horse's injury, BNSF 
supervisors began the process of evidence gathering, preserving his hard 
hat, despite the fact that McLeod had determined it “had no evidence of a 
significant impact.”44  McLeod and others viewed the video footage 
within hours of the accident, but declared it irrelevant.  But the fact they 
reviewed it at all shows they knew of its potential evidentiary value that 
should have triggered within them a sense of duty to preserve it, as they 
did with the hard hat.  But unlike the undamaged hat that was preserved, 
McLeod and other BNSF staff “inexplicably” allowed the video evidence 
to be destroyed.45  The Court saw this act as inexplicable, but there is 
indeed a likely explanation—that it was done to suppress the truth and 
gain an advantage in litigation.  This simple explanation would mean that 
McLeod acted not only with substantial certainty of the results, but with 
a destructive purpose—meeting the criteria for intent and bad faith both, 
and removing the possibility conjectured by the majority that the footage 
was inadvertently destroyed. 
Understanding this line of reasoning, Justice Wheat's specially 
concurring opinion of the three is the most incisive.  Like the majority, 
Wheat recognized the vital importance of punishing spoliators to 
preserve the integrity of the civil justice system.  But unlike the majority, 
Wheat sees that a policy is nothing if it is merely exhortatory—there 
must be substantive consequences when policies are violated for 
meaningful change to come about.  This divergence is nicely illustrated 
in the majority opinion where the Court recognized that a willful, bad 
faith shielding of the truth and a pattern of willful, bad faith conduct are 
circumstances appropriate for default judgement, but then failed to 
                                           
40 Spotted Horse, 350 P.3d at 54. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 57. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 58. 
45 Id. at 57. 
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impose default judgment on BNSF despite the actions of its General 
Foreman McLeod.  Recall that he (1) had utilized the video recording 
system before in connection with injuries; (2) knew he could have 
requested a copy of the video footage; and (3) knew that the system 
would overwrite recordings with the passage of time.  He knew the 
footage existed because he admitted to watching it and determining that 
it was not important.  So there was at least a modicum of deliberation 
where he weighed the significance of the footage as it might relate to 
future litigation.  In spite of that knowledge, he willfully allowed the 
footage to be destroyed.  If that act and deliberation alone does not signal 
a bad faith shielding of the truth under the standards proffered by the 
Court for default judgment, then it is at least a link in the chain of 
BNSF's pattern of bad-faith discovery abuses—another clear marker that 
the imposition of default judgment would be appropriate and necessary.  
Justice Wheat did not provide either a test for when default judgment is 
appropriate for spoliation claims, but his opinion is premised upon the 
idea that although it may be unclear when default judgment is 
appropriate, it is appropriate here, where a savvy corporation 
conveniently disposed of video evidence to gain a litigation advantage.  
The majority opinion enumerated the right policy reasons to punish 
spoliators and preserve the integrity of the civil justice process, but it is 
Wheat's opinion that followed through with support for and an analysis 




The facts of this case provided the Court with an opportunity to 
create a roadmap showing when and how default judgment should be 
both an effective remedy and a deterrent in spoliation claims.  Without 
this roadmap, and without the realistic threat of such a deterrent, 
seasoned corporate litigants have little incentive to prevent spoliation in 
the first place as punishments short of default judgment often leave them 
in a position where they nonetheless enjoy an advantage in litigation they 
would not otherwise have had if the evidence had not been destroyed.  
To borrow slightly from Learned Hand's negligence formula, the 
advantage can be viewed like this: if the evidence at issue definitively 
means liability, its loss or destruction means then that there is no longer a 
definite showing of liability.46  When a spoliator analyzes potential 
punishments by the court for the loss of that definite liability, anything 
less than the implementation of liability—default judgment—means an 
inherent gain in the bottom line through a litigation advantage.  Thus, 
adverse inferences, evidentiary presumptions and other remedies that are 
not default judgment leave those litigants to enjoy a better position they 
                                           
46 U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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would not have had absent the spoliation. Until a line is drawn that 
succinctly shows where judicial discretion ends and default judgment 
must be wielded, prospective litigants have little to lose when critical 
evidence is lost or destroyed. 
